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TRIPS AGREEMENT ARTICLE 31(B): THE NEED FOR
REVISION
Ann Marie Effingham*
I. INTRODUCTION
American pharmaceutical companies spend more than fifty
billion dollars per year in research and development (“R&D”) in order
to bring new drugs to market.1 This immense investment is justified by
the need to create a “blockbuster drug” that will solve a medical issue
prevalent among millions of people.2 These blockbuster drugs
generate media attention, create hype among medical professionals,
and generate enormous sales.3 The idea is that the revenue from
several blockbuster drugs makes up for all the other disappointments
in the R&D process.4
In addition to creating blockbuster drugs, American
pharmaceutical companies rely on patent protection in order to
safeguard their investments in R&D.5 While the American patent
protection model is sufficient to protect domestic patents, it is
disrupted when American patents are used outside of the United
States.6

* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, The College
of New Jersey. Special thanks to Professor David Opderbeck for his guidance
throughout the writing of this Comment.
1
See PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM., 2015 BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH
INDUSTRY PROFILE vi (2015), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/
2014_PhRMA_PROFILE.pdf [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Research].
2
Neil F. Hazaray, Note, Do the Benefits Outweigh the Risks? The Legal, Business, and
Ethical Ramifications of Pulling a Blockbuster Drug Off the Market, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
115, 117–18 (2007) (defining “blockbuster drug”).
3
Id. at 118.
4
See David W. Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58
VAND. L. REV. 501, 519 (2005) (explaining that pharmaceutical companies depend on
blockbuster drugs to recoup R&D costs).
5
Pharmaceutical Research, supra note 1, at 28 (“IP-intensive manufacturing
industries are defined as those industries that are more R&D-intensive than the
average for all manufacturing sectors, and which rely heavily on patents to produce
innovations.”).
6
Jamie Feldman, Note, Compulsory Licenses: The Danger Behind the Current Practice,
8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 137, 141 (2009).
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In an effort to standardize intellectual property protection across
the world, the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS
Agreement”), set forth the minimum levels of protection that
members of the WTO must enact.7 The TRIPS Agreement details
minimum standards of protection for intellectual property rights
including: copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial
designs, and patents.8 Each of these elements is defined along with the
rights afforded each element and the permissible exceptions.9
Likewise, the TRIPS Agreement provides guidelines for how member
countries should enforce and settle disputes over intellectual property
rights.10 The provisions also articulate the minimum duration of
protection for each element.11
Despite these minimum levels of protection with which WTO
member countries must comply, the TRIPS Agreement provides
exceptions in certain exigent circumstances. Specifically, Article 31(b)
of the TRIPS Agreement allows for WTO members to use the subject
matter of patents without the patent holder’s authorization in times of
national emergency.12 This compulsory licensing13 scheme has allowed
less developed countries (LDCs)14 to obtain patent licenses to generic
drugs that help solve national emergencies.15 In some ways, this
7

Intellectual
Property:
Protection
and
Enforcement,
WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited
Feb. 11, 2016).
8
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
9
See also Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
10
See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 7.
11
Id.
12
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b).
13
License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “compulsory license”
as “[a] statutorily created license that allows certain people to pay a royalty and use an
invention without the patentee’s permission”).
14
The WTO differentiates between “developing countries” and “least developed
countries.”
Compare The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/appendix/appendixb.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) (click “D” alphabetical tab and scroll to “developing
countries”), with The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/appendix/appendixb.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) (click “L” alphabetical tab and scroll to “less
developed countries”). For purposes of this Comment, “LDCs” refers to both
developing countries and least developed countries.
15
Riadh Quadir, Note, Patent Stalemate? The WTO’s Essential Medicines Impasse
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compulsory licensing scheme has proven to be beneficial to LDCs that
are affected by national health emergencies, but in other instances,
LDCs are exploiting the availability of compulsory licenses.
For example, in the 1990s, the World Bank projected that 1.2
million Brazilians would be living with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) by
the year 2000.16 In order to rid the country of its projected path of
disease, Brazil negotiated with American pharmaceutical company
Abbott Laboratories by threatening to obtain a compulsory license if
the parties could not reach a reduced price settlement for
antiretroviral medicines used to treat HIV/AIDS.17 This threat of a
compulsory license was a way for LDCs to get developed countries to
help them deal with national health crises.18
Conversely, there are instances in which LDCs have begun to
exploit the Article 31(b) exception by obtaining generic patent
information to treat diseases that are outside the scope of what many
developed countries consider true national emergencies.
For
example, in late 2006, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for two
antiretroviral drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS without trying to negotiate
a lower price settlement as in the Brazilian example.19 Thailand then
issued a compulsory license for a heart disease drug in 2007,20 and in
2008 it issued four compulsory licenses for cancer-treating drugs.21
Although Thailand’s usage of compulsory licenses in this way does not
per se violate Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, using compulsory
licenses in this manner does not align with the goal of the TRIPS
Agreement: supporting public health during times of national
emergencies.22 This is because identified cases of HIV/AIDS, cancer,
and heart disease—albeit great in number—should not all be treated
as national emergencies warranting the use of compulsory licensing.
between Pharmas and Least Developed Countries, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 437, 454 (2009).
16
Brazil – AIDS & STD Control III – Result Story, THE WORLD BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/WTXL9OB2H0 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
17
Jennifer Bjornberg, Comment, Brazil’s Recent Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution
or Retaliation?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 224 (2006).
18
Id. at 210–11; see also Quadir, supra note 15, at 439, 459–60.
19
Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Thailand Presents Report on Compulsory Licensing
Experience,
INTELL.
PROP.
WATCH
(Mar.
12,
2007),
http://www.ipwatch.org/2007/03/12/thailand-presents-report-on-compulsory-licensingexperience/.
20
Id.
21
Sinfah Tunsarawuth, New Thai Minister May Review Compulsory Licenses on Cancer
Drugs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.ip-watch.org/2008/02/08/
new-thai-minister-may-review-compulsory-licences-on-cancer-drugs/.
22
Quadir, supra note 15, at 452.

EFFINGHAM (DO NOT DELETE)

886

3/28/2016 11:49 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:883

This Comment will cover how the TRIPS Agreement can be
amended in order to make it function more effectively, thereby
encouraging LDCs to take advantage of the Article 31(b) exception
and simultaneously disallowing other LDCs from misusing the
exception.
Part II of this Comment discusses the historical
development of international intellectual property rights and how it
has evolved into the present-day understanding of the TRIPS
Agreement. Additionally, Part III examines what, in particular, the
TRIPS Agreement protects and how its shortfalls led to the Doha
Declaration.23 Part IV concludes with a discussion of the drafters’
purposes and goals when authoring the TRIPS Agreement. Part V
compares American pharmaceutical industries’ interests in a for-profit
business model with LDCs’ interests in managing national health crises
by using compulsory licenses. Part VI introduces instances in which
Thailand has used compulsory licenses in ways that do not align with
the goals of the TRIPS Agreement. Despite being a moderate-income
developing country, Thailand is not further developing the domestic
infrastructure needed to create its own medicines.24 Instead, it is
relying on compulsory licenses for medicines that treat illnesses and
diseases that most would not consider to be national emergencies
necessitating use of Article 31(b).25 Part VII analyzes how American
pharmaceutical companies can incentivize LDCs to take advantage of
the TRIPS Article 31(b) exception by proposing two solutions: (1) a
regulatory solution and (2) a patent lifespan extension solution. Part
VII also analyzes how the WTO can discourage LDCs from exploiting
the TRIPS Article 31(b) exception through the formation of an
international committee to investigate allegations of countries’ misuse
of compulsory licensing. Part VIII concludes.

23
The Doha Declaration confirmed and endorsed that the purpose of the TRIPS
Agreement is to support public health by promoting access to medicines. The major
change promulgated at the Doha Declaration was the Paragraph 6 Decision, which
effectively allows LDCs that do not have the manufacturing capabilities to issue a
compulsory license to a developed country that does have the capabilities to export
such medicines. See infra Part III.
24
Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended
TRIPS
Provisions,
10
J.
INT’L
ECON.
L.
921,
928
(2007),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2490&context=faculty_
scholarship (“The growing ability of some middle-income developing countries to
produce low-cost generic medicines under these regimes—notably in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, India, Thailand, Egypt, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea—made it
increasingly possible for even poor states to obtain certain low-cost generic medicines
on the world market, whether such products were on or off patents.”).
25
See infra Part IV.
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II. FROM THE PARIS CONVENTION TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: THE
ORIGIN OF COMPULSORY LICENSES
In 1883, one of the first international intellectual property treaties
was formed: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (“Paris Convention”).26
The treaty pioneered patent
protection and has served as a foundation for future international
intellectual property agreements.27 Today, 167 countries participate in
the Paris Convention.28 In 1967, the United Nations (U.N.) created
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which
supervises international intellectual property matters.29 WIPO has also
acted as the administrator to the Paris Convention as it has grown.30
Despite WIPO’s general success, it is inadequate to deal with
international patent policies due to its inability to effectively and
efficiently adjudicate intellectual property disputes.31 As the leaders in
patentable products, developed countries have tried to use WIPO to
authorize strong protection for international patents.32 In contrast,
LDCs pushed for a more malleable patent scheme that could work with
their societies’ growth and innovation as their countries continued to
develop.33
To resolve WIPO’s inadequacies, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was formed as a treaty in 1947, but by the
1970s it evolved into an international trade organization.34 The
developed countries’ new method to get LDCs to comply with their
international patents was to tie patent protection to trade policy.35
26

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as last revised July 14, 1967),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=287556.
27
Quadir, supra note 15, at 447.
28
WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016)
(enumerating all contracting countries).
29
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention; see also Elaine B. Gin, International
Copyright Law: Beyond the WIPO & TRIPS Debate, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 763,
780–81 (2004).
30
See Gin, supra note 29, at 780–82.
31
Id. at 780; see also Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 121, 131 (1994).
32
See Gin, supra note 29, at 780–82.
33
Id. at 781–82.
34
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 70–71, 73 (1993).
35
See Vandana Date, Global “Development” and Its Environmental RamificationsThe
Interlinking of Ecologically Sustainable Development and Intellectual Property Rights, 27
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Because LDCs needed trade to fuel their economic and social growth,
they were required to comply with this stricter view of patent
protection.36
In 1995, GATT developed into the WTO, which was charged with
“reducing trade barriers and creating a robust international trading
platform.”37 This reorganization of the WTO further engrained the
connection between trade and patent policy.38 As part of the
reorganization of GATT, the TRIPS Agreement was created.39 The
WTO is authorized to supervise the TRIPS Agreement and settle
disputes between member countries using its Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB).40 Today, 162 countries are WTO members.41
All member countries must abide by the TRIPS Agreement, which
established minimum levels of copyright, trademark, and patent
protection.42 Despite the differences of opinion between LDCs and
developed countries regarding intellectual property protection, the
TRIPS Agreement has created a workable international intellectual
property framework that has proven successful.43
The TRIPS
Agreement’s minimum standards of intellectual property protection
are required to be upheld throughout all member countries regardless
of their domestic laws.44
A. Article 31(b) and Other Exceptions to the TRIPS Agreement
While this Comment focuses on the Article 31(b) exception, it is
important to appreciate the various other exceptions to the TRIPS
Agreement in order to best understand their interrelatedness. Article
7 stresses the importance of technological innovation in a manner
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 631, 659–61 (1997).
36
Id.
37
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994), http://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/03-fa.pdf; Quadir, supra note 15, at 448.
38
Quadir, supra note 15, at 448.
39
Id.
40
Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health,
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 1470 (2007).
41
Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Members and Observers, WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb.
11, 2016).
42
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8; Samira Guennif & Julien Chaisse, Present
Stakes Around Patent Political Economy: Legal and Economic Lessons from the Pharmaceutical
Patent Rights in India, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 67 (2007).
43
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8; see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra note 42, at
67.
44
CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 8 (2007).
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conducive to social and economic welfare.45 Article 8 generally allows
member countries to take any action to protect the public that are
“necessary” and “consistent” with the TRIPS Agreement,46 and Article
27(2) acknowledges the balancing act between the need for public
health and intellectual property protection.47 Article 31(b) permits
patent use without the authorization of the right and articulates the
requirements of obtaining a compulsory license.48
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.49
The enforcement of intellectual property protection seeks to uphold
social and economic welfare. Arguably, this section implies that the
TRIPS Agreement consists of more than rules and several exceptions
that allow a country to issue a compulsory license and import
medicines whenever exigent circumstances exist.50 This section, when
taken in tandem with other sections, encompasses the TRIPS
Agreement’s broad scope to not only help a country use
technological—in this case patent-related—advances to its advantage,
but to also benefit the producers of the information.51
Article 8 states, “[m]embers may, in formulating or amending
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement.”52 This broad language seems to indicate
that members can take any action so long as it is “necessary” and

45

See infra notes 49–50.
See infra notes 52–53.
47
See infra notes 54–56.
48
See infra notes 58–61.
49
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 7 (emphasis added).
50
Id.; see also CARLOS M. CORREA & ABDULQAWI A. YUSUF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 12 (1998); Amir Attaran, The Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options
Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859, 871 (2002).
51
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.
52
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 8.
46
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“consistent” with the TRIPS Agreement.53
Article 27(2) states:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions,
the prevention within their territory of the commercial
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public
or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their
law.54
This Article acknowledges the balancing between intellectual property
protection and the need for public health.55 Some argue that this
Article should allow HIV/AIDS medicines to be exempt from the
TRIPS Agreement.56 Others argue that this Article simply prohibits
hazardous inventions from being patentable.57
Article 31(b) provides, in relevant part, that patent use without
authorization of the right holder:
[M]ay only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and
that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable
period of time. This requirement may be waived by a
Member in the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public noncommercial use. In situations of national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder
shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably
practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where
the government or contractor, without making a patent
search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a
valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the
right holder shall be informed promptly . . . .58
This Article is the most controversial of the exceptions to the TRIPS
Agreement.59 In effect, it allows LDCs, under certain circumstances, to

53
54
55
56

Id.; CORREA, supra note 44, at 106.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 27(2).
Id.; see also Attaran, supra note 50, at 871.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 27(2); see also Attaran, supra note 50, at

871.
57

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 27(2); see also Attaran, supra note 50, at

871.
58
59

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 31(b).
See CORREA, supra note 44, at 313.
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use member countries’ patents without consent.60 This exception is
commonly referred to as “compulsory licensing.”61 The goal of Article
31(b) is to allow an LDC to manufacture a generic drug domestically
for less than the cost of purchasing and importing it from the foreign
pharmaceutical company.62
B. When and How Compulsory Licenses Are Used
Article 31(b) articulates how a compulsory license is obtained.63
It requires an LDC to negotiate with the patent holder to purchase
pharmaceuticals at a reasonable price and within a reasonable amount
of time.64 This requirement may be waived if an LDC has a national
emergency, is facing other circumstances of extreme urgency, or plans
to use the pharmaceuticals for a public, non-commercial use.65 These
exceptions to the negotiation requirement allow LDCs to completely
bypass bargaining with the patent holder and, instead, to issue
compulsory licenses without prior notice.66
Bypassing bargaining with the patent holder and issuing a
compulsory license imposes on the LDC several requirements that
must be met in order to obtain the patented information. To issue a
compulsory license under the Article 31(b) list of exemptions, an LDC
must first notify the patent holder.67 Second, an LDC must be able to
domestically manufacture the pharmaceutical for which it issues a
compulsory license.68 Domestic manufacturing requires a country to
have sufficient industrial and technological bases, such as banking
institutions, transportation, and other assets that are necessary to
domestic industry.69 Third, an LDC must reasonably compensate the

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id.
63
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra
note 42, at 80.
64
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra
note 42, at 80.
65
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra
note 42, at 80.
66
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra
note 42, at 80.
67
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also CORREA, supra note 44, at
313.
68
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(f); CORREA, supra note 44, at 313. But
see infra note 79 (explaining that the Paragraph 6 Decision did away with this
requirement in 2003).
69
Zita Lazzarini, Essay, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options
Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 134 (2003).
61
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patent holder.70 There is no precise formula to determine reasonable
compensation.71 Adequate remuneration is determined by taking into
account the economic value conferred upon the importing LDC by the
developed country in granting the compulsory license.72
III. THE DOHA DECLARATION
In 2001, several years after the TRIPS Agreement took effect, the
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha
Declaration”) was promulgated in order to clarify and possibly amend
the TRIPS Agreement.73 The Doha Declaration reaffirmed that the
TRIPS Agreement’s “interpretation should support public health by
promoting access to existing medicines and the creation of new
medicines.”74 While the Doha Declaration helped promote the TRIPS
Agreement’s overall purpose, it failed to shed light on the meaning of
“national emergency” or “other circumstances of extreme urgency.”75
One major change that the Doha Declaration effectuated was the
Implementation of Paragraph 6 (“Paragraph 6 Decision” or “the
Decision”). At the Doha Declaration, many LDCs voiced complaints
that they could not take advantage of the Article 31 exception because
it required domestic production—resources and infrastructure—to
which LDCs did not have access.76 This requirement, they criticized,
inhibited their ability to access medicines through compulsory
licenses.77 In response to these complaints, the Council for the TRIPS
Agreement issued the Paragraph 6 Decision.78 The Paragraph 6
70

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(h).
See id.
72
Edited by Sean D. Murphy, Modification of WTO Rules on Protection of
Pharmaceuticals, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 981, 982 (2003).
73
WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41
I.L.M. 755 (2002), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_e.pdf [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
74
Quadir, supra note 15, at 453.
75
Bjornberg, supra note 17, at 206.
76
Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 929–30.
77
Id.
78
See WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14
November 2001, para. 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf
[hereinafter WTO Declaration]. As noted by the WTO:
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We
instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.
Id.
71
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Decision waived the Article 31(b) domestic market requirement.79 In
effect, the Decision allows member countries that do not have an
ability to domestically produce a drug to issue a compulsory license for
pharmaceutical drugs and to issue a compulsory license to developed
countries in order to export the pharmaceutical drugs.80 It also
requires the importing LDC to issue a compulsory license to import
the pharmaceutical drugs.81 As of this Comment’s writing, WTO
members are deciding whether to make this waiver a permanent
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement.82
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
The WTO delegates’ intent behind the TRIPS Agreement can be
summarized in three main points: (1) to protect developed countries’
R&D investments; (2) to promote industry in developing countries;
and (3) to advance public health, especially in developing countries.83
American pharmaceutical companies spend more than fifty billion
dollars in R&D annually in order to bring new medicines to market.84
If generic pharmaceutical companies in foreign markets are able to
circumvent American patent protection by continuing to import these
medicines, there is little incentive for American pharmaceutical
companies to develop drugs that will help these developing countries.
Thus, the WTO sought to promote R&D by instituting minimum levels
of worldwide patent protection.85

79

Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doc. WT/L/540 (Sept. 1,
2003) [hereinafter Paragraph 6 Decision]; see also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24,
at 932.
80
Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 79; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 932.
81
Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 79; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 932.
82
Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 79; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 932.
83
See CORREA & YUSUF, supra note 50, at 10–15; SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER,
PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 12162 (2003);
Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE
L.J., no. 2, 2002, at 57, 58 (2002); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing
Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 49 (2002); Grace K. Avedissian,
Note and Comment, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward Compulsory
Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of “Super-Terrorism,” 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
237, 251 (2002); Understanding the WTO: The Agreements: Intellectual Property: Protection
and Enforcement, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
agrm7_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter TRIPS Explanation].
84
Pharmaceutical Research, supra note 1, at 58.
85
See CORREA & YUSUF, supra note 50, at 10–15; SELL, supra note 83; Sykes, supra
note 83.
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Another goal of the TRIPS Agreement is to promote industry,
especially in developing countries.86 By protecting intellectual
property, trade barriers should theoretically decrease, which, in turn,
would increase developing countries’ growth and development.87
Thus, the WTO sought to promote industry by creating international
patent protection.88
The final, and arguably the most important, goal of the TRIPS
Agreement is to advance public health.89 In connection with the first
goal that sought to protect R&D, this goal “attempts to strike a delicate
balance between the short-term objective of providing access to
existing medicines and the long-term objective of developing new
medicines through incentives for future Research and Development.”90
Additionally, the TRIPS Counsel acknowledged the necessity of
“maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and
regulations in order to enable [the developing countries] to create a
sound and viable technological base.”91 Thus, while the WTO wanted
to allow compulsory licenses to combat public health crises, it
simultaneously wanted to promote developing countries’ selfsustainability through the creation of their own medicines.92 These
twin aims—self-sustainability and health crisis management—are
clearly at odds with the way compulsory licenses are currently being
used.93

86
Ansari, supra note 83, at 58–59 (“Poor international intellectual property
protection has been analogized to trade barriers . . . .”); TRIPS Explanation, supra note
83.
87
Ansari, supra note 83, at 58–59.
88
Id.
89
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 8.
90
See CORREA & YUSUF, supra note 50, at 11 (citing Arnoldo Lacayo, Comment,
Seeking a Balance: International Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, Public Health Crises, and
the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 295, 312 (2002));
Avedissian, supra note 83, at 251.
91
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at preamble.
92
Id.
93
See infra Part IV.
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V. COMPETING INTERESTS BETWEEN AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES & LDCS
A. American Pharmaceutical Companies’ Interests
Pharmaceutical companies research, develop, and market
medicines.94 The largest pharmaceutical companies are located in
Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and the United States—all developed
countries.95
American pharmaceutical companies alone are
responsible for bringing 300 new medicines that treat 150 conditions
to market since 1990.96 As such, they are partially responsible for the
improvement of peoples’ quality of life worldwide.97
Pharmaceutical companies’ incentive to bring new medicines to
market is closely tied to policy—specifically, policy that promotes
“effective use of intellectual property.”98 Pharmaceutical companies
have a strong interest in policy because intellectual property policy,
more specifically patent protection, allows these companies to recover
the considerable R&D costs expended before a drug hits the market.99
The cost for creating a new drug can range from at least $50 million to
$600 million.100
This process includes “discovery, preclinical
development, three phases of clinical trials, registration, and postAnd if the drug passes these phases,
marketing studies.”101
pharmaceutical companies may spend up to an additional $200 million
on marketing.102
Pharmaceutical companies depend on patents in order to protect
these large investments.103 Predictable patent protection is especially
important because it allows pharmaceutical companies the ability to
determine in which markets advertising would most likely allow them

94
See Bjornberg, supra note 17, at 209–10; see also Pharmaceutical Research, supra
note 1, at 17; PHARMA. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM., THE FACTS ABOUT PHARMACEUTICAL
MARKETING & PROMOTION 17 (2008), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/
pdf/marketing_and_promotion_facts_071108_final.pdf.
95
See Bjornberg, supra note 17, at 209–10; see also KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 52 (2000).
96
Quadir, supra note 15, at 441.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 441–42
99
Id. at 443.
100
Id. at 442.
101
Id.
102
Quadir, supra note 15, at 442.
103
Pier DeRoo, Note, “Public Non-Commercial Use” Compulsory Licensing for
Pharmaceutical Drugs in Government Health Care Programs, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 347, 362
(2011).
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to recover their large R&D investments.104 Investments in R&D are
largely profit-driven.105 Therefore, if a pharmaceutical company is
unlikely to recover the costs of R&D due to an unstable domestic or
international patent regime, it is unlikely to make the initial
investment.106
Governmental support of pharmaceutical companies and their
profit-driven business models account for much of the reason that
some developed countries have threatened or resorted to retaliatory
acts.107 For example, the United States has put Thailand and Brazil on
Section 301 of the Trade Act, a watch list for countries the United
States believes to be noncompliant with U.S. intellectual property
protection policies.108
B. LDCs’ Interests
Generally, LDCs are trying to increase their own economic
growth.109 The U.N. supports this endeavor by funneling significant
resources toward developing LDCs.110 Many of these resources come
from, and are the product of, developed countries’ support of LDCs.111
Notwithstanding developed countries’ financial contributions, LDCs
still lack the infrastructure needed to provide predictable patent
protection.112

104

Quadir, supra note 15, at 443.
See id.
106
See id.
107
See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 980.
108
Id.
109
See U.N. Charter arts. 55–58, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/
uncharter.pdf; Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO,
TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333, 334
(2000).
110
Quadir, supra note 15, at 443–44.
111
Id.
112
Maria L. Mellino, Note, The TRIPS Agreement: Helping or Hurting Least Developed
Countries’ Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1349, 1352–53 (2010).
105
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LDCs also have a strong interest in protecting the health of their
citizens.113 The U.N. recognizes health as a fundamental right for all.114
In fact, many advocates of LDCs’ accessing pharmaceutical drugs
frequently cite this right in support of their objectives.115 Undoubtedly,
there is a relationship between LDCs’ level of health and their ability
to create the necessary infrastructure and to grow economically.116
Unlike developed countries, LDCs do not have the monetary resources
to address their countries’ health epidemics.117 Yet several countries,
including Brazil, India, Malaysia, and Thailand, offer national
treatment programs to citizens for little or no cost.118 Thus, despite the
developmental efforts LDCs make, the treatment of HIV/AIDS in
these countries is still a hindrance to their overall economic success
given the interrelatedness between health and economic growth.119
VI. THAILAND’S MISUSES OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ARTICLE 31(B)
EXCEPTION
Over the course of a short timespan, Thailand has issued
compulsory licenses for a variety of different pharmaceutical drugs,
including medicines that treat HIV/AIDS, heart disease, and cancer.120
For example, in late 2006, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for two
antiretroviral drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS.121 In 2007, Thailand
113
See David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health
in the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 191–92, 195 (1999)
(explaining that the economic gap between developed and developing countries is
linked to health of their respective populations, with the physical and economic
burdens of poor health falling disproportionately on developing countries); James
Thuo Gathii, How Necessity May Preclude State Responsibility for Compulsory Licensing Under
the TRIPS Agreement, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 943, 958–59 (2006) (explaining
that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has slowed economic progress because the disease
usually infects individuals during the productive periods of their lives, and the care of
these individuals falls on the families of those infected—further detracting from
3
economic growth); Madhavi Sunder, IP , 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 292 (2006).
114
WORLD HEALTH ORG. CONST. pmbl., opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat.
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185, http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_
en.pdf; see also Fidler, supra note 113, at 194.
115
Quadir, supra note 15, at 444.
116
See Fidler, supra note 113, at 194–95.
117
See Sinfah Tunsarawuth, Governments Urged to Use Compulsory Licenses to Boost Drug
Access, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 23, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2007/11/23/governments-urged-to-use-compulsory-licences-to-boost-drug-access/.
118
UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 2010
160–63 (2010), http://www.unaids.org/globalreport/documents/20101123_
GlobalReport_full_en.pdf.
119
See Fidler, supra note 113, at 196–97; Gathii, supra note 113, at 961.
120
See infra Part VI.
121
Gerhardsen, supra note 19.
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issued a compulsory license for a heart disease drug,122 and in 2008, it
issued four compulsory licenses for cancer-treating drugs.123 These
instances show Thailand’s trend toward using compulsory licenses in
ways that do not align with the goals of the TRIPS Agreement. First, in
relation to HIV/AIDS medicines, Thailand began negotiating in 2006
with Merck & Co. for Efavirenz.124 Nothing came of the negotiations,
and in November 2006, Thailand issued a compulsory license for
Efavirenz.125 Around the same time, Thailand began negotiating with
Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) for Kaletra, an HIV/AIDS treatment.126
After several months of negotiating, Thailand issued a compulsory
license for Kaletra in 2007.127 Subsequently, Abbott withdrew seven
pending pharmaceutical applications in Thailand.128 It is unclear what
Abbott’s rationale was for withdrawing the applications, but Abbott
denied that the withdrawals were in response to Thailand’s issuing the
compulsory license.129
Many, however—including the Thai
government—argue that Abbott withdrew the applications as
retaliation toward Thailand.130 Abbott eventually reduced the price of
Kaletra to the price that the Thai government commanded during
negotiations.131
Second, in relation to heart disease, Thailand issued a compulsory
license in 2007 to Sanofi-Aventis for Plavix, a blood thinner medicine
used to treat heart disease.132 This was the first time that a compulsory
license was issued for a chronic disease,133 which therefore made the
issuance even more controversial.134
122

Id.
Tunsarawuth, supra note 21.
124
See David Cronin, EU Split Arises Over Thai Effort to Obtain Cheaper Patented Drugs,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
index.php?p=732; see also Gerhardsen, supra note 19.
125
See Gerhardsen, supra note 19.
126
Id.
127
See Cronin, supra note 124.
128
Abbott to Reduce Cost of Kaletra in Thailand, Other Developing Countries, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (June 11, 2009), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/morning-breakout/
dr00044189/ [hereinafter Reduce Cost of Kaletra]; Martin Vaughan, In Clash with
Activists, Critics Charge Thailand Violation of Trade Rules, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 19,
2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=569.
129
See Vaughan, supra note 128.
130
See Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from
Fiction under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371, 444 (2009) (noting that the
intent may be inferred from American pharma’s actions).
131
See Reduce Cost of Kaletra, supra note 128.
132
Gerhardsen, supra note 19.
133
As opposed to an infectious disease like HIV/AIDS.
134
JOANNA T. BROUGHER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES:
123
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Third, in relation to cancer-treating medicines, Thailand issued
four more compulsory licenses in 2008.135 It issued two to Novartis: one
for Gleevec, a treatment for leukemia and gastrointestinal stromal
tumors, and one for Femara, a treatment for breast cancer.136 Thailand
also issued one compulsory license to Sanofi-Aventis for Taxotere, a
treatment for lung and breast cancer.137 Finally, it issued one
compulsory license to Roche for Tarceva, a treatment for lung
cancer.138 Thailand’s continued issuance of compulsory licenses is
creating immense tension between Thailand and pharmaceutical
companies.139 It seems as though Thailand is using compulsory licenses
as its default mechanism for obtaining access to medicines, indicating
a disconnect between the TRIPS Agreement’s intended use and its
actual use.140
Thailand’s use of compulsory licenses for more commonplace
diseases is not in accord with the problems that Article 31(b) intended
to solve. The TRIPS Agreement was implemented to strike a balance
between providing access to medications for LDCs and developing new
medicines through R&D.141 The delegates of the WTO that oversaw
the TRIPS drafting process acknowledged that LDCs needed to create
a sound technological base.142 By recognizing this as a goal, the drafters
sought not only to provide immediate access to medicines for the
short-term, but also to support LDC’s development toward creating
their own medicines over the long-term.143
To reiterate, Article 7 states that intellectual property protections
should be instituted “in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare.”144 This implies that the TRIPS Agreement was enacted for a
larger goal than simply allowing LDCs to issue compulsory licenses
anytime there is a public health emergency. Rather, it seeks to
promote social and economic welfare for all member countries.
Article 8(1) states that member countries should “promote the public

BALANCING INNOVATION AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 182–83 (2014).
135
Tunsarawuth, supra note 21.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
See Gerhardsen, supra note 19.
140
See id.
141
See CORREA & YUSUF, supra note 50, at 11.
142
Id.
143
Jessica J. Fayerman, Comment, The Spirit of TRIPS and the Importation of Medicines
Made Under Compulsory License After the August 2003 TRIPS Council Agreement, 25 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 257, 268–69 (2004).
144
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 7.
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interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development.”145 While the TRIPS Agreement allows for
compulsory licenses, one of its main goals at the time of adoption was
to help bolster member countries’ economic and technological
development.146
Thailand’s continued use of compulsory licenses circumvents
Articles 7 and 8, which call for intellectual property protection while
also encouraging economic welfare. Rather than create its own
infrastructure to complete the R&D process of its own pharmaceutical
drugs, Thailand instead resorts to issuing compulsory licenses for the
patent formula and then manufacturing them domestically, leaving
developing countries to bear the R&D cost burden.147
Article 31 does not expressly prohibit the types of activity in which
Thailand engages.148 Article 31(b) only applies in cases “of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of
public non-commercial use.”149 When taken in concert with Articles 7
and 8, however, Article 31(b) is meant to be a rare exception to the
general, strict patent protection regime.150 It is meant for situations
145

Id. at art. 8.
Id. at art. 7.
147
See Thai Health Ministry Breaks Patent, Issues Compulsory License for Abbott’s
HEALTH
NEWS
(June
11,
2009),
Antiretroviral
Kaletra,
KAISER
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/morning-breakout/dr00042592/; see also Dina Halajian,
Note, Inadequacy of TRIPS & the Compulsory License: Why Broad Compulsory Licensing Is
Not a Viable Solution to the Access to Medicine Problem, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1191, 1192–93
(2013).
148
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31.
149
Id. at art. 31(b).
150
Id. at arts. 7, 8, 31(b); Johanna Kiehl, TRIPS Article 31(b) and the HIV/AIDS
Epidemic, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 164 (2002). Kiehl states:
According to Canada, Article 7 makes the balance between the
intellectual property rights created by the Agreement and other
important socio-economic policies of WTO Member governments one
of the TRIPS Agreement’s key goals. Furthermore, Article 8 elaborates
the socio-economic policies in question, with particular attention to
health and nutritional policies. The European Communities, in
comparison, viewed Articles 7 and 8 as statements that describe the
balancing of goals that had already taken place in negotiating the final
texts of the TRIPS Agreement.
Id. at 164 (footnotes omitted). See also Jennifer R. Andrew, Swine Flu, Bird Flu, SARS,
Oh My! Applying the Precautionary Principle to Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under
Article 31 of TRIPS, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 405, 435 (2011). Andrew reasons that,
according to the plain terms of Article 8.1, public health measures adopted by
Members must be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement (such as TRIPS
Article 27.1 discussed below) and “necessary” to protect public health. A panel will
find that TRIPS Article 31(b) public health emergency legislation is not consistent with
TRIPS Article 27.1, that it is not “necessary” under Article 8.1, and that when the other
terms of Article 31 are applied in the HIV/AIDS context, it upsets the basic balance of
146
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where life-threatening epidemics hinder an LDC’s economic growth.151
It is more acceptable to issue compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS
because the LDCs requesting them are usually impacted to the point
where much of their populations are affected, and the countries do
not have the wherewithal to stop the epidemic.152
Thailand’s current compulsory licenses have implicitly exceeded
the scope of Article 31(b). What began as a way for the country to fight
its HIV/AIDS crisis has evolved into a way for Thailand to escape
developing its own infrastructure and technological base needed to
create its own medicines. While heart disease and cancer may affect a
large population of Thai citizens, these diseases do not rise to the level
of epidemic proportions requiring the need for compulsory licenses.
VII. SOLUTIONS TO THE CURRENT PATENT REGIME
In order to incentivize LDCs to utilize the TRIPS Article 31(b)
exception without exploiting it, this Comment proposes two domestic
solutions: (1) a Regulatory Solution and (2) a Patent Lifespan
Extension Solution. Alternatively, in order to discourage LDCs from
exploiting the TRIPS Article 31(b) exception, this Comment proposes
a Suspension Solution.

the Agreement. Id. at 435.
151
See WTO Declaration, supra note 78. It provides in relevant part:
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems
afflicting many developing and least-developed countries,
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics.
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important
for the development of new medicines. We also recognize the
concerns about its effects on prices.
5. (c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency,
it being understood that public health crises, including those
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics,
can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency.
Id. See also Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme
Court in PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 796 (2004).
152
See, e.g., Gathii, supra note 113, at 961 (“[T]he long term health interests of the
population of African countries should be given more weight than the property rights
interests that would be injured by compulsory licensing of essential medicines.”); see
also Halajian, supra note 147, at 1192–93 (“Developing countries often lack the
capabilities and infrastructure to create IP, such as patentable drugs, and are thus
primarily IP importers, and lack an incentive to protect IP. These countries favor
weaker IP rights, which allow market entry of generic drug manufacturers and
increased market competition. Market entry and competition lower drug prices,
resulting in increased availability of affordable medications.”).
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A. Regulatory Solution
The Regulatory Solution would consist of the American Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) pausing, or slowing down, the passage rate
of new and developing American pharmaceuticals. This would take
place until American pharmaceutical companies help LDCs by
providing generic drug patent information, manufacturing medicines,
and/or distributing medicines. This regulatory solution would
prevent American pharmaceutical companies from bringing new
drugs to market until they comply with the compulsory licenses issued
to them.
Although it is uncommon for a pharmaceutical company to
blatantly refuse to comply with compulsory licenses, there are instances
where American pharmaceuticals are skirting, avoiding, or prolonging
the process. For example, “Thailand issued compulsory licenses to
achieve its mandate of providing access to essential drugs after years of
negotiation with patent owners failed to yield price cuts beyond the
level of currency appreciation.”153 These lengthy negotiations,
spanning a number of years without ultimately leading to a reduction
in cost, give the impression that some companies are attempting to
circumvent the compulsory license.154
The Regulatory Solution would ensure a more direct form of
compliance by promoting the use of compulsory licenses as an effective
negotiation tool155 when pharmaceutical companies are completely
unresponsive to the drug needs of LDCs. Such a solution would also
support the U.N.’s recognition that all people have a fundamental
right to health156 by more readily providing medicines to LDCs.
An impediment to this solution, however, is the FDA. With the
ability to make its own rules and the ability to control which
pharmaceutical drugs are brought to market, the FDA is the only
regulatory body that could prevent American pharmaceutical
companies from bringing new drugs to market. This regulatory body
“has the authority to issue its own rules so long as they support the
intent of the statutes and regulations which they are intended to

153
See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV.
1047, 1062 (2009).
154
Id.
155
Feldman, supra note 6, at 155 (“In the past, Brazil, for example has successfully
used compulsory licenses as a tool to negotiate lower prices from both Merck and
Roche.”).
156
WORLD HEALTH ORG. CONST. pmbl., opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat.
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185, http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_
constitution_en.pdf; see also Fidler, supra note 113, at 194.
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enforce.”157 Additionally, no medicine can be sold in the United States
without FDA approval.158 In order for a medicine to obtain approval,
the pharmaceutical company must complete the Investigational New
Drug Application.159 This application is supported by all of the
research and clinical trials that the drug has undergone.160 After
successful completion of the application, the FDA deems the drug safe
and effective.161 Because the FDA is able to make its own regulations,
it could make rules to enforce such a solution.
The FDA, however, may not be able to make such a regulation.
Professor Peter Schuck has stated that “[m]any critics denounce the
agency’s enforcement activity as lax and inadequate,” and “some go so
far as to claim that the regulated industries have ‘captured [the
FDA],’” thus making it impossible for it to regulate effectively.162 He
continued to explain that a recent examination of various industries’
influence over Congress found pharmaceutical companies to be the
most influential over Congress.163 Considering how much power
pharmaceutical companies wield over the FDA, it is unlikely that such
a solution could even be considered.

157

Jennifer S. Bard, What to Do When You Can’t Hear the Whistleblowing: A Proposal to
Protect the Public’s Health by Providing Whistleblower Protection for Medical Researchers, 9 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 1, 17 (2012) (citing Julia Kobick, Negotiated Rulemaking: The Next Step in
Regulatory Innovation at the Food And Drug Administration?, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 425, 434
(2010) (“FDA has never voluntarily convened a rulemaking negotiation, and Congress
has never statutorily mandated that FDA establish an ad hoc negotiated rulemaking
committee.”)).
158
W. Christopher Matton & F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance: Federal
Regulation of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 283, 293–96 (2004).
159
Id. at 295.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the
Sweet Sport, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 112 (2008).
163
Id.; see also Jennifer S. Bard, Putting Patients First: How the FDA Could Use Its
Existing Powers to Reduce Post-Market Adverse Events, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 495, 553
(2013) (“The most likely source of congressional power to regulate prescription drugs
is found in the power the Constitution gives Congress in Article I, Section 8 to regulate
commerce.”); Eric R. Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the Command-andControl Model of Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 105, 118–21 (2004) (explaining how
Congress initially conferred to the FDA, an executive agency, the power to enforce
regulations and how its power has since expanded to include the rulemaking powers
and the promulgation of procedural regulations); Kate Cook, The Presidential FDA:
Politics Meets Science, DIGITAL ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARVARD, 5–6
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8852216 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016)
(explaining the mechanisms Congress possess to control the FDA).
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B. Patent Lifespan Extension Solution
The second domestic solution this Comment proposes is a Patent
Lifespan Extension Solution. In this solution, the U.S. Patent Office
would allow pharmaceutical companies that willingly participate in
compulsory licensing to extend their patent lifespan by several months
or a year. This solution would serve as a more “pharma-friendly”
option to American pharmaceutical companies than the first proposed
Regulatory Solution.
This patent lifespan extension could potentially be promulgated
through the Hatch-Waxman Act.164 Before the Hatch-Waxman Act,
generic drug companies that wished to sell and market off-patent
drugs needed to go through the same rigorous FDA approval process
that new brand-name drugs went through.165 The Hatch-Waxman Act
effectively changed that and, among other patent protections for
pharmaceutical companies, provided for patent term extensions
averaging three years.166 Given that a typical patent lifespan lasts twenty
years, the patent term extensions were necessary since the term
realistically only lasts about seventeen years because the patent
application and FDA approval process take approximately three
years.167 Given the Hatch-Waxman Act’s existing ability to extend
patent terms, the suggested patent lifespan extension solution is a
cohesive and consistent addition to its already existing powers. The
timeframe given to pharmaceutical companies that comply with
compulsory licensing would be “inserted” after the time in which a
patent is currently set to expire and the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
extension term, immediately preceding the time in which a generic
company may apply for the patent. While this solution may constrain
domestic, generic pharmaceutical companies’ access to brand name
drugs, it promotes the betterment of international public policy by
advancing LDCs’ access to medicines—a primary goal of the TRIPS
Agreement.168

164

See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28,
& 35 U.S.C.).
165
Amanda Baltazar, The Hatch-Waxman Act, ABOUT MONEY, http://pharmacy.
about.com/od/Glossary/a/The-Hatch-Waxman-Act.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
166
Id.
167
WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41114, THE
HATCH-WAXMAN
ACT:
A
QUARTER
CENTURY
LATER
3
(2012),
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/R41114_031320
13.pdf.
168
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at arts. 7, 8.
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This solution may be workable given that pharmaceutical
companies are largely driven by corporate profits.169 In fact, the WHO
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public
Health (CIPIH) recognizes that profits drive pharmaceutical
companies.170 If pharmaceutical companies are able to dominate the
American market for several months (or a year) longer by having their
patent lifespans extended domestically, they have the ability to
produce hundreds of millions, or even billions, of dollars in additional
profit.171 The benefit of this is to recoup the millions of dollars lost in
the R&D process.
Profits, however, are never guaranteed: “With the exception of a
few blockbuster drugs, the commercial success rate of pharmaceuticals
remains low. In fact, just two out of ten medicines ever produce
revenues that match or exceed average R&D costs.”172 In order to make
up for the low rates of return for many drugs, this Patent Lifespan
Extension Solution would incentivize domestic pharmaceutical
companies to help LDCs by providing generic drug information.
Generally, public policy wants to promote generic drug
competition, and this solution is in conflict with that ideal.173 A major
factor in the promotion of generic drugs is that it can reduce public
healthcare costs in one of three ways: (1) generic substitution of drugs
for the therapeutically equivalent branded drug;174 (2) therapeutic
169
Jennifer A. Lazo, The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act: Why the Proposed U.S.
Compulsory Licensing Scheme Will Fail to Export Any Medicines or Save Any Lives, 33 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 237, 270–71 (2007).
170
Id.
171
See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO.
L.J. 637, 675 (2013) (“[A] single patent—particularly a patent on a successful
pharmaceutical—could be worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars per
year.”).
172
Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities Class Action
Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 911, 916 (2010) (citing Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., Pharmaceutical
Industry Profile 2009, 38–39 (2009)).
173
Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 248 (2012) (“The
Hatch-Waxman Act therefore promotes generic market entry by relieving almost all of
the regulatory burdens for generic manufacturers, as well as by helping generic
manufacturers challenge the validity of brand-name pharmaceutical patents that
might be hindering such market entry.”).
174
“Therapeutically equivalent” drugs are those that have the same active
ingredient, strength, dosage form, and route of administration. Substitution can be
made by either a prescriber or a pharmacist, according to state regulations and laws.
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 2–3 (2010),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/76151/ib.pdf.
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substitution;175 and (3) reduction in the price of brand name drugs
paid by consumers resulting from generic substitution.176 The rate at
which generic drugs are substituted (when there is a generic substitute
available) is nearly ninety percent, which accounted for a savings of
$121 billion in 2008.177 Therefore, a plan that delays generic drug
competition would hinder the savings to the domestic market. It is
likely the American public who would oppose this solution because the
solution would suppress the free-flow of medicines in the domestic
market by constricting who the manufacturers are for an even longer
period of time than before.178
When contrasted with the international public healthcare benefit,
however, this patent lifespan extension scheme seems the most viable
solution. Extending the patent lifespan for American pharmaceutical
companies could generate revenue on their name-brand drugs, which
in turn could offset the cost of participating in the compulsory license.
The American generic market would be delayed slightly thereby
hindering domestic savings but it would be at a cost that benefits
international public health. Thus, this solution presents several
hurdles but is more realistic than the first Regulatory Solution.
C. Suspension Solution
In order to discourage LDCs from exploiting the TRIPS Article
31(b) exception, this Comment proposes a Suspension Solution. The
WTO can discourage or prohibit LDCs from exceeding the bounds of

175

“Therapeutic substitution” is switching from a branded drug to a generic in the
same therapeutic class. Only a prescriber may make this substitution; a pharmacist
may not do this because the drugs are not therapeutically equivalent. Id. at 4.
176
Id. at 3–4.
177
ALAN SHEPPARD, GENETIC MEDICINES: ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE LONGHEALTH
OF
SOCIETY,
IMS
HEALTH
3
(2010),
TERM
http://www.sandoz.com/cs/www.sandoz.com-v4/assets/media/shared/documents/
press_releases/100401_Generic_Medicines_GA.pdf.
178
See, e.g., Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
1314 (2013) (“On the issue of patent reform, a civil war of sorts divides the technology
community. Battle lines are drawn largely between industries. Pharmaceutical
companies, on one side, argue that strong patent rights are crucial to continued
innovation. High-tech firms, on the other, view the patent system as more foe than
friend.”); Thomas H. Kramer, Proposed Legislative Solutions to the Non-Practicing Entity
Patent Assertion Problem: The Risks for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 39 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 467, 479–81 (2014) (explaining that technology and pharmaceutical industries
bitterly dispute more or less regulated patent regimes, with technology industries
wanting more lax laws and pharmaceutical industries wanting more stringent
protection).
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Article 31(b) by suspending member countries that violate it.179 Under
this solution, the WTO would create an international committee that
could investigate allegations of misuse. The committee would have the
authority to suspend countries from the WTO if found guilty of
practices that do not conform with proper patent protection policy.
This solution would serve to deter countries, like Thailand, from
engaging in practices that are not necessarily initiated because of a
national emergency.
The suspension solution may be a viable resolution because the
WTO would not need to create another enforcement body to
moderate these disputes. The TRIPS Agreement already has a dispute
settlement process built into it—the DSB. The DSB has the authority
to issue trade sanctions against member countries and serves as an
enforcement mechanism for all WTO issues, including conflicts
regarding the TRIPS Agreement.180 It also settles most disputes within
fifteen months, although countries can settle their dispute themselves
at any stage.181 This enforcement mechanism could serve as the
179

WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 58 (2007), http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf. Before trade sanctions are imposed,
the complaining party (referred to as the “plaintiff” for purposes of this Comment)
must bring a complaint before the DSB. Id. If the DSB finds that the opposing party
(referred to as the “defendant” for purposes of this Comment) is in fact noncompliant,
it will make recommendations for how the defendant can bring its policy up to the
status quo. Id. If the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time, it
must enter into negotiations with the plaintiff to determine acceptable
compensation—i.e., tariff reductions, etc. Id. And if no satisfactory compensation
agreement is reached, the plaintiff may ask the DSB to impose limited trade sanctions.
Id.
180
See id. at 55–57.
181
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Feb.
11, 2016). The website explains:
Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multilateral trading system,
and the WTO’s unique contribution to the stability of the global
economy. Without a means of settling disputes, the rules-based system
would be less effective because the rules could not be enforced. The
WTO’s procedure underscores the rule of law, and it makes the trading
system more secure and predictable. The system is based on clearlydefined rules, with timetables for completing a case. First rulings are
made by a panel and endorsed (or rejected) by the WTO’s full
membership. Appeals based on points of law are possible . . . . However,
the point is not to pass judgement [sic]. The priority is to settle disputes,
through consultations if possible . . . . If a case runs its full course to a
first ruling, it should not normally take more than about one year—15
months if the case is appealed. The agreed time limits are flexible, and
if the case is considered urgent (e.g. if perishable goods are involved), it
is accelerated as much as possible.
Id.
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tribunal to investigate practices of excessive compulsory licensing.
The advantage of this solution is that the DSB already exists as a
functioning dispute resolution body. Therefore, this solution would
require less of a drastic change compared to the other two proposed
solutions. The disadvantages of this solution are twofold: (1) it may
not serve public health goals and (2) actions that exceed the bounds
of the TRIPS purpose are not easily defined. The first drawback is in
conflict with Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, which encourages
member countries to take measures necessary to protect public health
and to promote socio-economic development.182 When compared to
this purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, this solution may not be
viable.183
The second disadvantage of this solution is that it would require
a consensus among member countries as to what constitute a practice
that misuses the Article 31(b) exception—a feat that may be easier said
than accomplished. The DSB is currently set up in a way that
establishes “panels” of well-qualified experts to consider a case, and
panelists are typically chosen in consultation with the countries in
dispute.184 Since the DSB already chooses panelists with the help of the
parties, there may be less of a dispute about what constitutes a practice
that misuses the Article 31(b) exception.
Furthermore, the DSB was marked at its inception as a kind of
“Star Chamber” decision-making process, which gave rise to questions
of its transparency.185 Since the Seattle Ministerial of 1999, there have
been three major changes to the WTO that have increased its
transparency, which include: (1) public access to documentation
through its website;186 (2) acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in both
panel and Appellate Body proceedings; and (3) public participation in
the WTO adjudicating bodies, committees, and councils.187 Despite
these changes, much of the DSB’s activity remains confidential.188
Therefore, in order for the suspension solution to be viable, the DSB
182

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 8.
Id.
184
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution, supra note 181.
185
Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the
First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 44–45 (1999).
186
With regard to dispute settlement body, “the availability of documentation
varies depending on the particular stage of the process” that a case is in. Most disputerelated documents, however, are not automatically made public in an effort to protect
confidential information. Gabrielle Marceau & Mikella Hurley, Transparency and Public
Participation in the WTO: A Report Card on WTO Transparency Mechanisms, 4 TRADE L. &
DEV., no. 1, 2012, at 24, 24–25.
187
Id. at 23, 28, 36.
188
Id. at 43.
183
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would need to overhaul its confidential process in order to further
increase its transparency and legitimize its decision-making process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although Thailand’s repetitive use of compulsory licensing is not
considered a per se violation of the TRIPS Agreement, the country’s
actions seem suspicious. It is understandable and acceptable that an
LDC seeks a compulsory license to treat its growing HIV/AIDS
epidemic. Compulsory licensing for cancer and heart disease
medicines, however, do not seem to constitute exigent circumstances,
given that many other countries across the globe face similar health
concerns. Undoubtedly, cancer and heart disease are leading causes
of death, but they are not infectious. They do not spread rapidly
through under-educated and destitute countries the way HIV/AIDS
does. And while many people in Thailand may be suffering from
cancer and heart disease, compulsory licensing should not be a means
to an end.
Rather than resorting to compulsory licensing, Thailand should
first divert more resources to increasing its infrastructure so it may
complete its own R&D for new medicines. Alternatively, Thailand
could manufacture and distribute off-patent generic drugs—a business
model that many American generic pharmaceutical companies have,
with lower cost being a driving factor. This solution is even more
feasible given Thailand’s moderate-income status.
Besides domestic steps that Thailand can take, WTO members
internationally and the United States domestically can take initiatives
to prevent the kinds of practices that Thailand is engaging in, namely
through the Patent Lifespan Extension Solution and the Suspension
Solution. The Patent Lifespan Extension Solution is a way to
encourage domestic pharmaceutical companies to help LDCs that are
in dire need of medicines. Alternatively, the Suspension Solution is a
way to discourage countries like Thailand that exceed the reasonable
bounds of compulsory licensing from misusing Article 31(b) to their
own benefit. Admittedly, both of these solutions need to be examined
and discussed further before implementation. They do, however,
provide a basis to change the current patent regime that would further
effectuate the overall purpose of the TRIPS Agreement—access to
necessary medicines for all.

